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Contrary to most years, many of this year's cases decided in
the period covered by this Survey cover important substantive
principles of the law of Torts.
CRIMINAL CONVERSATION
This year's most interesting case, FenneZ v. Littlejohn,1 illus-
trates several points, some legal, and some moral. This suit based
on the heretofore obscure theory of criminal conversation in-
volved these facts: The plaintiff separated from his wife in
October, 1959, because of her adultery with one Erickson and
instituted divorce proceedings against her, the plaintiff con-
tinuing to provide a home and maintenance for her. Upon recom-
mendation of the plaintiff, his wife was employed by the defend-
ant to do office work. A hearing was held in the divorce action
on January 5, 1960, and on January 8, 1960, the master held a
conference with the plaintiff and his wife in an attempt to effect
a reconciliation, but was unsuccessful. On March 25, 1960, the
defendant was caught in the act of adultery with the plaintiff's
wife in the home the plaintiff was providing for her. Thereafter,
the divorce proceeding was re-opened to name the defendant as
a co-respondent to the wife's adultery, and the final divorce
decree was granted on April 29, 1960, finding the wife guilty
of adultery with the defendant and two others.
In the suit which was instituted for the tort of criminal con-
versation, the plaintiff recovered a verdict of 2,000.00 dollars,
actual damages and 16,000.00 dollars punitive damages, later
reduced by the trial judge to 8,000 dollars.
The Supreme Court upheld the verdict and laid down the law
of criminal conversation which may be stated as follows:
Criminal conversation means adulterous relations between
the defendant and the spouse of the plaintiff. . . . And to
sustain the action it was necessary for the plaintiff to estab-
lish two things, namely: (1) The marriage between the
spouses, and (2) sexual intercourse between the defendant
and the wife during coverture .... Alienation or loss of
* Henderson, Salley & Cushman, Aiken, South Carolina.
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affections is not a necessary element of the action...
[citations omitted].-
Although actions for alienation of affections and for criminal
conversation are alike in that they both arise from the marital
relation and are both torts against the right of consortium, they
are nevertheless essentially distinct in that criminal conversation
necessarily requires adultery while alienation of affections does
not. Proof of pecuniary damage is not necessary to sustain the
action of criminal conversation.
Although the common law action for criminal conversation
has apparently long been recognized in this state, this is only the
third case which has been presented on appeal, the first two
being very old cases.
In upholding the judgment the court placed great reliance
upon the authorities which indicate the strong public policy of
this state relating to marriage and the high regard in which our
law holds the marriage relationship or status. The court struck
down the defendant's principal defense to the action with the
following statement:
While the authorities are not in agreement, we think the
better rule is that proof of the prior separation of the parties
and lack of affection between them are matters in mitigation
of damage, but are not fatal to the cause of action. Neither
does the fact that the plaintiff obtained a decree of divorce
from his wife subsequent to the alleged adulterous act con-
stitute a bar to the action.3
This case illustrates the tenacious power and strength of the
common law in which an appropriate factual situation can invig-
orate nearly forgotten doctrines and obscure precedents. It also
illustrates the results which a resourceful advocate can obtain.
WIFE'S LOSS OF HUSBAND'S CONSORTIUM
Page v. -Winter4 holds that no cause of action exists in favor
of a wife to recover damages for loss of the consortium of her
husband due to injuries negligently inflicted upon him. The
majority of three justices reasoned in a short opinion that recov-
ery in such cases was not permitted under the common law, and
the Supreme Court, therefore, had no right to repudiate the
2. Id. at 195, 125 S.E.2d at 412.
3. Id. at 198, 125 S.E.2d at 413.
4. 240 S.C. 516, 126 S.E.2d 570 (1962). Note, 15 S.C.L. REv. 810.
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common law rule even though it may be illogical, undesirable or
wrong, any change in the rule being for the legislature.
In an extensive and well-reasoned dissent by Mr. Justice
Bussey, it was argued that the legal right of the wife to the con-
sortium of the husband has been recognized by the decisions of
this state,5 and that the wife's right to recover for the intentional
invasion of her right to her husband's consortium has been recog-
nized and enforced.0 Therefore the plaintiff should be allowed
to recover for a negligent invasion of this right, any bar to such
action having been removed by the Married Women's Act which
completely removed the disability of coverture.
BAILMENTS-LIABILITY OF BAILEE
FOR DAMAGE TO GOODS
Shoreland Freezers, Inc. v. Textile Iee &f FueZ Go. is an inter-
esting and important case on the law of bailments. The plaintiff
had delivered a quantity of frozen vegetables to the defendant
for storage in its frozen food storage warehouse. Neither party
inspected the vegetables at the time they were delivered for stor-
age. Thereafter, vegetables were withdrawn from storage indis-
criminately for several months and were found to be in good
condition. Later, however, vegetables withdrawn were found to
be frozen in a solid block and were therefore worthless.
The trial court directed a verdict in favor of the defendant,
holding that there was no proof that the vegetables were in good
condition when delivered to the defendant bailee. The Supreme
Court held that the fact that the vegetables withdrawn in the
first few months of storage were found to be in good condition
gave rise to the reasonable inference that all of the vegetables
were in good condition when delivered to the defendant. The
court further held that a jury issue as to the negligence of the
defendant arose from the inferences summarized above and from
the further evidence that there was a considerable amount of
clear ice on the storage room floor, indicating a rise in the tem-
perature sufficient to allow the ice to melt and then re-freeze
as ice, which would result in a partial thawing and re-freezing
of the plaintiff's vegetables in a solid block.
The court adopted the rule that the damage of stored goods
caused by the negligence of the bailee does not prevent his recov-
5. Holloway v. Holloway, 204 S.C. 565, 30 S.E.2d 596 (1944).
6. Messery v. Messery, 82 S.C. 559, 64 S.E. 753 (1909).
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ering storage charges, where he makes compensation for the
damages.
The case contains a full, clear and precise statement of the sub-
stantive and procedural rules governing liability of a bailee
under a bailment for mutual benefit.
DEFAMATION-LIBEL
In Appliance Buyers Credit Corp. v. Baxleys the plaintiff
which had purchased conditional sales contracts from the de-
fendants had sent a letter or letters to a customer or customers
of the defendants requesting that all future payments on account
be made direct to the plaintiff, and advising that the plaintiff
could not be responsible for any future payments made to other
than an authorized employee of the plaintiff. They also asked
whether the customer records agreed with the plaintiff's and if
not, requested information as to what payments had been made
and to whom. In a suit for breach of contract, the defendants
counterclaimed for libel. The Supreme Court reversed the trial
court and sustained the plaintiff's demurrer to the counterclaim
on the grounds that the acts complained of had been authorized
by the contract between the parties and there had been no alle-




Conwefl v. Spur Oil Co.9 is an excellent example of the opera-
tion of the defense of qualified privilege in the law of defama-
tion. The secretary of the defendant corporation had written a
letter to the plaintiff, manager of one of the defendant's stations,
stating in effect that the plaintiff was short $5.68 in his ac-
count of premium cash which had not been entered on his daily
report. A copy of the letter was sent to the defendant's district
manager. The letter sent to the plaintiff was read by the assistant
manager and by another employee. The plaintiff contended that
the innuendo of the letter was that the plaintiff had sold mer-
chandise and failed to account for it to the defendant and had
thus committed the criminal offense of breach of trust. In the
ensuing suit for libel, the jury's verdict in favor of the plaintiff
8. 241 S.C. 64, 127 S.E2d 8 (1962). This case is also noted in the Pleading
section at note 8.
9. 240 S.C. 170, 125 S.E.2d 270 (1962).
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for actual damages found that the charge contained in the letter
was false. However, the Supreme Court reversed the case and
ordered judgment entered for the defendant upon the ground
that even assuming the communication to be legally libelous, it
was qualifiedly privileged, and there was no evidence of express
malice, malice in fact, nor ill will of the defendant to the plain-
tiff, which would overcome the defense of qualified privilege.
The court held the communication to be qualifiedly privileged,
having all the essential elements of a conditionally or qualifiedly
privileged communication, namely, good faith, an interest to be
upheld, a statement limited in its scope to this purpose, a proper
occasion, and publication in a proper manner and to proper
parties only.10 The opinion contains an excellent discussion of
the elements of qualified privilege and citation of authorities
on the point.
EMPLOYER'S LIABILITY FOR INJURIES
OF EMPLOYEE
It is somewhat surprising that even with widespread Work-
men's Compensation, two cases in the Supreme Court this year
dealt with the master's common law liability for injuries sus-
tained by his employee in the course of employment. In both
cases judgment was granted for the defendant employer as a
matter of law.
In Bellamy v. Hardee"L the plaintiff, employee of the defend-
ant, was injured by a bumper jack which stripped and fell while
the plaintiff was using it to raise a section of a dragline. The
Supreme Court reversed the plaintiff's judgment for actual
damages and ordered entry of judgment for the defendant. In
searching the record for evidence of negligence sufficient to sup-
port the verdict, the court assumed that the defendant was ini-
tially negligent in furnishing only the automobile bumper jack
for the employee's use, rather than a hydraulic jack. However,
the plaintiff himself was thoroughly experienced and was in
sole and complete charge of the operation; his judgment was
regarded as superior by his employer; and he had never asked
for different equipment, though his employer had offered to
furnish whatever was needed. The court concluded that the plain-
tiff was barred by his own contributory negligence in continuing
10. Id. at 179, 125 S.E.2d at 275, quoting 33 A.m. Jtm. Libel & Slander § 126
(1942).
11. 242 S.C. 71, 129 S.E.2d 905 (1963). This case is also noted in the Agency
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to use the bumper jack and in failing to make any definite re-
quest for, or effort to obtain, a more suitable jack. The doctrine
of proximate cause is another ground for the decision: even if
both parties were guilty of negligence, that of the plaintiff was
the immediate, proximate cause of his injury, and that of the
defendant was remote.
In Jackson V. Powe12 the plaintiff had been injured while
assisting in loading baled cotton on the truck of his employer,
the defendant. The bale was being lowered by a hydraulic lift
operated by an employee of the gin company, and the plaintiff
was guiding it into place when it fell and injured him. The court
affirmed a nonsuit, holding there was no proof of negligence on
the part of the defendant, the defendant not being responsible
for any negligence on the part of the lift operator who was
employed by and under the control of the gin company.
NUISANCE
Winget v. Winn-Diccie Stores, Inc.'s is a case which illustrates
the conflict of rights arising from the spread of business into a
residential district. The plaintiffs sought damages and an in-
junction against the defendant for the alleged nuisance in the
location and operation of the defendant's large chain grocery
super-market which was established next to the plaintiff's resi-
dence. The court held that the location of the business could not
be held to constitute a nuisance, since the business was a lawful
one and was located in an area zoned for retail business by the
City of Sumter and determined by the City's Zoning Board to be
suitable for a retail grocery.
In analyzing whether the operation of the store could be held
to constitute a nuisance, the Supreme Court broke the plaintiff's
complaint into its specific constituent elements and determined:
1) the normal increase of traffic and noise caused by customers
coming and going is a natural concomitant of the operation of a
business and therefore cannot constitute a nuisance; 2) the noise
caused by the loud operation of trash trucks and street sweepers
by the City of Sumter cannot be attributed to the defendant and
therefore cannot constitute the basis of nuisance on the part of
the defendant; 3) however, those acts and complaints not normal
or necessary incidents of the operation of the business may con-
12. 241 S.C. 35, 126 S.E2d 841 (1962). This case is also noted in the Agency
section at note 10.
13. 242 S.C. 152, 130 S.E.2d 363 (1963). This case is also noted in the
Property section at note 7.
19631
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stitute elements of nuisance, e.g., fans blowing against the plain-
tiff's trees and shrubbery, floodlights casting bright glare over
the plaintiff's property until late at night, obnoxious odors aris-
ing from the garbage, and paper and trash being permitted to
escape onto plaintiff's property to an unusual extent.
The Supreme Court held that the trial court properly denied
injunctive relief (such had become the law of the case) because
the acts which would prove any basis for damages arising from
nuisance in the operation of the business had been largely, if not
entirely, discontinued.
The case was remanded for a new trial as to those acts of the
defendants which would constitute grounds for the award of
damages for nuisance.
TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACTUAL
RIGHTS
Smith v. Citizens & o. Nat'l Bank14 establishes and recog-
nizes a limiting principle in regard to the tort known as malicious
interference with a contractual relation, namely, that in order
to constitute actionable interference with a contract, it must
appear that the act complained of was the proximate cause of the
injury or damage. Briefly, the complaint alleged the following.
The plaintiffs and the defendant Sloane had been partners in a
road building job. The plaintiffs owed the defendant C & S Bank
$1,485.65, and the bank advised Sloane to issue a check for
that amount jointly to the bank and the plaintiffs in his settle-
ment with the plaintiff. The plaintiffs were forced to agree to
this arrangement although they unsuccessfully urged Sloane to
ignore the bank's demands. After securing the plaintiffs' written
release on these enforced terms, Sloane repudiated the settlement
and paid neither the bank nor the plaintiffs. The complaint fur-
ther alleged that the bank by its demands interferred with the
plaintiffs' contractual relation with Sloane and induced and
coerced him to breach his contract with the plaintiffs. The lower
court sustained the demurrer as to the defendant C & S Bank,
holding that the plaintiffs' failure to receive from Sloane the
amount due them resulted from Sloane's refusal to pay under
any circumstances and not from the bank's directions as to dis-
bursement of the funds. The Supreme Court affirmed, on the
ground that the bank's act was not the proximate cause of the
plaintiff's loss.
14. 241 S.C. 385, 128 S.E2d 112 (1962). This case is also noted in the
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STATUTE OF LIMITATION
In the factually novel case of Brown v. Finger15 the plaintiff
had recovered a verdict of $55,170 against the defendant, a
physician, for loss of consortium of his wife and for recovery
of his medical expenses incurred on her behalf as the result of
the defendant's having wilfully and maliciously administered
and made available narcotics to the plaintiff's wife, reducing her
to an addict, and effectively destroying their marriage. The
decision on appeals involved points of damages and procedural
law. The court reversed and remanded the case for a new trial,
pointing out that despite the adoption of the Married Women's
Acts, the husband still retains his common law right to recover
for the loss of the consortium of his wife caused by the wrongful
act of a third person, although by statute the wife and not the
husband is entitled to recover for the loss of her separate
earnings.
The primary point of interest here is the application of the
six-year statute of limitations to the facts. The action was in-
stituted on December 13, 1954. The plaintiff's wife first began
using narcotics under the defendant's advice and direction in
1947, and inferentially did not become addicted until 1949 or
1950. Of course, the statute of limitations commences to run only
from the time that the cause of action accrues. The difficulty is
when, at what point of time, does the husband's right to sue for
loss of the services, society and companionship of his wife ac-
crue? On this point the court held, in accordance with the better
view, that the cause of action does not accrue until the loss of
services and companionship actually occurs, and therefore it was
a jury issue as to whether the plaintiff's claim was barred by
the statute of limitations.
The court held that although the contributory negligence of
the wife constituted a defense in derivative actions of this kind,
such issue was not involved in the case since the defendant has
not pleaded it.
RES JUDICATA AS BETWEEN JOINT TORT FEASORS
A single clear-cut legal issue, so rare in the majority of auto-
mobile cases, confronted the court in Kinard v. Polk': If a pas-
senger recovers judgment against both the driver of the automo-
15. 240 S.C. 102, 124 S.E2d 781 (1962).
16. 241 S.C. 555, 129 S.E.2d 527 (1963). This case is also noted in the
Pleading section at note 15.
1963]
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bile in which he was riding and the other automobile, is that
judgment res judicata so as to bar a subsequent suit by one of
the co-defendants against the other? Our Supreme Court held
that such a former suit was not res judicata and thus did not bar
the second suit. The reason for this rule is that the parties were
not adversaries in the first suit and had no opportunity to liti-
gate the issues between them. That the co-defendants could have
become adversaries in the first action by filing cross pleadings
under the authority of Section 10-707 of the 1962 Code was held
to be without legal significance in view of the permissive lan-
guage of the statute.
NEGLIGENCE OF BOTTLER
In Boyd v. Marion Coca-Cola Bottling Co.,1T the Supreme
Court held that a jury issue was presented as to the defendant
bottling company's negligence in selling bottles of Coca-Cola
likely to explode on account of excess of pressure of gas, in
failing to provide a bottle of sufficient strength, and in failing
to use due care in filling the bottle. The plaintiff had been in-
jured when a bottle of Coca-Cola bottled and sold by the de-
fendant exploded while he was taking bottles from the crate and
placing them in his drink box, cutting his face to the extent that
ten stitches were required to close the wound. According to the
plaintiff's testimony, another bottle from the same crate ex-
ploded about the same time as the one which injured him, and
about two weeks later, another bottle of Coca-Cola exploded
while undisturbed in the crate.
Of course, as pointed out by the court, the doctrine of res ipsa
Zoguitur does not prevail in this state, and there must be proof
of negligence on the part of the defendant, which may be by
circumstantial as well as by direct evidence.
The Boyd case is in accord with prior authority to the effect
that although the explosion of a single bottle of carbonated
beverage, standing alone, would not be sufficient to make out a
case of actionable negligence, where there is evidence of other
instances of bottles filled, charged and distributed by the same
bottler, exploding under substantially similar circumstances and
reasonable proximity of time, the case should be submitted to
the jury on the issue of negligence.' 8
17. 240 S.C. 383, 126 S.E.2d 178 (1962).
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PARTIAL ASSIGNABILITY OF
PERSONAL INJURY CLAIMS
Doremus v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R.,19 is an extremely im-
portant decision on the substantive law question of the partial
assignability of personal injury claims and the dependent but
more important procedural question of the removal of such suits
from the state court to the United States District Court. Upon
petition of the minor plaintiff's guardian ad Hitem to the Court
of Common Pleas, approval and sanction was given for the as-
signment of a 1/100th interest in the minor plaintiff's cause of
action for personal injuries unto one J. F. Davis, a party plain-
tiff who presumably was a resident of the state in which the
defendant railroad is incorporated. The Supreme Court upheld
the partial assignment against the defendant's attack, holding
definitely for the first time that under South Carolina law a
partial assignment can be made of a claim for personal injuries.
The court upheld the rule that if a claim survives the death of
the holder thereof, it is assignable. The general principle that
survival is the test of assignability had been laid down by Bult-
man v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R.,20 which involved property
damage, and it was applied to personal injury claims in the
Doremus case.
The technique of preventing removal of a tort suit to the
United States District Court by partial assignment of the plain-
tiff's claim to a resident of the same state in which the defend-
ant resides, thus defeating diversity of citizenship, has been often
used in South Carolina, but has now been given judicial sanction
under state law. This technique was fully discussed in a short
treatise entitled "Guide to Removal and Its Prevention (In
Code States)" written in 1948 by Thomas M. Boulware of the
Allendale Bar.
LIABILITY FOR INJURY TO CUSTOMER
OR BUSINESS GUEST
Jaudon v. F. V. Woolworth Co.21 was a suit against a store
owner to recover for personal injury to a customer. The plaintiff,
a 75 year old woman, entered the Woolworth store in Charleston
to buy a green plant to take to a sick friend. Not finding the
item she wanted, the plaintiff summoned a saleslady who showed
19. 242 S.C. 123, 130 S.E.2d 370 (1963).
20. 103 S.C. 512, 88 S.E. 279 (1915).
21. 303 F2d 61 (4th Cir. 1962).
1963]
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her the entrance to the garden shop from the main store area,
it was necessary to climb three 61/ inch stairs, to go through the
two doors out a circular or fan shaped platform inside the plant
department, and then to step down 61/2 inches from the platform
to the floor of the plant department. The defendant's saleslady
held the door open for the plaintiff and did not point out the
step-down. There was no sign warning of the step-down, as her
attention was directed to the display in the storeroom. The plain-
tiff fell and fractured her hip, requiring hospitalization and
the insertion of a steel nail. While in the hospital the plaintiff
suffered a stroke which according to medical testimony was
causally connected with the plaintiff's fall.
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the action of
the district judge, sitting without jury, in awarding the plaintiff
$16,029.00 actual damages, holding that the evidence war-
ranted a finding of the defendant's negligence in failing to warn
plaintiff of the step-down either orally or by sign, and that the
plaintiff was not contributorily negligent as a matter of law.
This reviewer originally intended to criticize the decision be-
cause it allowed the inattention of the plaintiff, or the diversion
of her attention, to excuse her duty of exercising due care for
her own safety and thus to destroy completely the defense of
contributory negligence. However, the principle that forgetful-
ness or inattention may under some circumstances be excused
and thus overcome contributory negligence has now been adopted
by the South Carolina Supreme Court in Conner v. Farmers &
Merchants Bank.22 Although the Connor case is outside the pe-
riod covered by this Survey, I will quote from the decision
therein on the point in question:
The general rule for determining whether forgetfulness by
a plaintiff of a known danger constitutes contributory neg-
ligence is no different from the rule applied in other situa-
tions, that is, forgetfulness or inattention will amount to
negligence if it amounts to a failure to exercise due care.
The law recognized that the person of ordinary reason and
prudence sometimes forgets, is sometimes inattentive, and
is not perfect or infallible. Therefore, forgetfulness or inat-
tention may be excused when the circumstances are such that
a jury could reasonably conclude that a person of ordinary
prudence, so situated, might have forgotten.
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While forgetfulness of, or inattention to, a known danger
may under certain circumstances be excused, it is recognized
that a too liberal application of the principle can result in
fraud and could completely destroy the defense of contribu-
tory negligence. Therefore, it is settled that mere forgetful-
ness or inattention is sufficient. It is not enough to say "I
forgot." Neither is it enough to merely show that there was
some diverting circumstances at the time. In order to keep
forgetfulness of, or inattention to, a known danger from
constituting contributory negligence as a matter of law, the
evidence must be such as to give rise to a reasonable infer-
ence that the forgetfulness or inattention relied upon was
induced by some immediate, substantial and adequate dis-
turbing cause, to be determined in the light of the exigencies
of the situation and the facts and circumstances of the par-
ticular occasion.23
There is no reason why the same principle here applied to over-
come contributory negligence of a plaintiff would not also under
proper circumstances excuse the negligence of a defendant.
Holliday v. Great AtI. & Pao. Tea Co.,24 is another case in the
widening area of the tort liability of a proprietor for injuries
suffered by business guests. While walking at night from the
A & P Store in Sumter to her daughter's car in the parking lot
in front of the store, the plaintiff fell over a raised concrete
median strip and suffered injuries. On appeal from a judgment
in favor of the defendant granted by United States District
Judge Timmerman notwithstanding the verdict for the plaintiff,
the Court of Appeals reversed the case and remanded the case
for entry of the $10,000.00 judgment in favor of the plaintiff.
The appellate court held that the jury could properly have
found that the defendant was negligent either in failing to re-
paint the median with yellow paint within the eight-month
period preceding the injury when it had been "beaten off" the
median's edge, or in failing to maintain proper lighting at night
on the portion of the parking lot which it controlled. The court
further held that the plaintiff was not contributorily negligent
as a matter of law since she proceeded with caution, with one
hand on a parked car and looking as carefully as she could for
a "banana peel" or anything else that she might slip on.
23. Id. at 390.
24. 314 F.2d 682 (4th Cir. 1963).
1963]
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RAILROAD LAW
Two decisions of note were rendered in the Survey period in
the ever-important field of railroad law. Doremus v. Atlantic
Ooast Line R. R.25 is the more important of the two. The 13-
year old plaintiff recovered a verdict of 75,000.00 dollars actual
damages and 25,000.00 dollars punitive damages (reduced by the
trial judge from 50,000 dollars for the serious and substantial
personal injuries which he sustained in a collision between the
defendant's railroad engine and his brother's car in which he was
riding as a passenger. Although both the usual highway depart-
ment and the railroad warning signs were in place, the driver of
the car testified that he did not see either of them because the
sun was in his eyes and because they were partially obscured by
vegetation, that he did not know of the presence of the crossing
and that the first whistle blast was given when his automobile
was approximately 125 feet from the crossing. Evidence showed
that the crossing was obscured by vegetation, that the automobile
was traveling 35 to 40 miles per hour, and that the train was
traveling approximately 40 miles per hour despite a railroad rule
limiting speed to 25 miles per hour at the crossing in question.
The Supreme Court held that the evidence of the defendant's
negligence was sufficient to support the verdict and that the
driver of the automobile was not guilty, as a matter of law, of
gross or wilful contributory negligence imputable to his pas-
senger, the minor plaintiff, so as to bar his recovery under
Section 58-1004 of the 1962 Code.
The court held that not only was there evidence of the defend-
ant's failure to give the signals required by statute, but of com-
mon law delicts which the jury could have found to be negligent,
and wilful and the proximate cause of the collision. The court
stated:
Independently of the signal statute, Section 58-743 of the
Code, it is the common law duty of the Railroad Company
to give such signals as may be reasonably sufficient to view
of the situation and surroundings to put individuals using
the highway on their guard.
2 6
On the question of the imputation to the minor plaintiff, the
passenger, of the driver's contributory wrongdoing in failing to
see the warning signs or hear or observe the train until he was
25. 242 S.C. 123, 130 S.E.2d 370 (1963).
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within 125 feet of the crossing, the court reasoned that the jury
verdict was supportable upon two theories: (1) it was for the
jury to determine whether his conduct amounted to mere inad-
vertence or whether it amounted to the gross or wilful negligence
required by statute27 to bar recovery by a passenger; (2) the
jury could have found that the common law delicts of the defend-
ant railroad were the proximate cause of the collision and that
there was no failure to give the statutory signals which con-
tributed to the collision as a proximate cause, in which latter
case the wilful contributory negligence of the driver would be
inapplicable.
The Supreme Court established a principle of railroad law
heretofore unknown in this state which makes the plaintiff's
knowledge of a crossing a crucial matter in railroad litigation
by affirming the following jury instruction given in the
Doremn case:
I charge you that the duty of a traveler to look and listen
for an approaching train when he knew of the existence of
the crossing is very different from that of the traveler who
is ignorant of the crossing's existence. Without minimizing
the duty of a person approaching a railroad crossing to em-
ploy all of his senses for the purpose of ascertaining whether
or not it is safe to cross, such duty does not exist until the
traveler has knowledge, or by the exercise of reasonable
care, should have knowledge that there is, in fact, a cross-
ing. Otherwise, a person traveling upon a highway would
be under a continuous duty to look and listen for a train
regardless of where he was with reference to a railroad
crossing.
2 s
In the other case, Gossett v. Piedmont & No. Ry., 29 the sole
issue before the Supreme Court was whether the plaintiff truck
driver was guilty of gross contributory negligence as a matter
of law in failing to look to his left immediately before commit-
ting himself to enter upon the crossing where he was struck by
the defendant's locomotive, since he could have seen the train in
time to avoid the collision had he looked. The court affirmed the
jury verdict for the plaintiff, holding that the plaintiff's failure
27. S.C. CODE § 58-1004 (1962).
28. Doremus v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., supra note 25 at 146, 130 S.E.2d at
375.
29. 241 S.C. 501, 129 S.E.2d 362 (1963).
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to look did not rise to the level of gross contributory negligence
as a matter of law. The court reasoned as follows:
Blakely's view of the track was obstructed until he was close
upon it. He was entitled to rely to some extent upon the
absence of the statutory signals and the failure of the cross-
ing signal to flash a warning. It would be reasonable to
infer that his vigilance was further blunted by the con-
tinued movement of traffic over the crossing as he drew
near. It may also be inferred that he approached the cross-
ing at a reasonable speed and undertook to verify the assur-
ance of safety arising from the absence of signals by looking
and listening before entering upon the crossing. Under the
circumstances of this case, his testimony that he did look
and listen cannot be disregarded as incredible. Instead, it
lends support to the jury's finding that he was not entirely
heedless.3 0
PROXIMATE CAUSE
Probably the most important single Torts case in this survey
period is Horton v. Greyhound Corp.,3 1 a major decision on the
doctrine of proximate cause. As viewed by a majority of the
Supreme Court the evidence was that the plaintiff's intestate
was killed in a collision with a southbound Greyhound bus while
he was riding as a passenger in a pick-up truck traveling north
which pulled out to its left from behind a stopped vehicle signal-
ling for a left turn. The evidence clearly showed that the col-
lision occurred on the bus's side of the road but also that the bus
was traveling at an excessive and unlawful rate of speed.
The trial judge directed a verdict for the defendants and on
the plaintiff's appeal the sole question presented to the court
-was whether the evidence was susceptible of the reasonable
inference that the excessive speed of the Greyhound bus proxi-
mately caused the collision.
After a thorough and searching analysis of the evidence, the
court held:
It is abundantly clear that the primary efficient cause of the
collision was the unlawful act of the truck driver in turning
his northbound vehicle into the southbound lane of travel,
which was occupied by the approaching bus. It is equally
30. Id. at 507, 129 S.E.2d at 329.
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clear that the only evidence of a negligent or unlawful act
by the bus driver relates to excessive speed, which could not
have resulted in harm to Scott if the truck had remained in
its proper lane of travel. The concurrence of excessive speed
with this primary, efficient cause of the collision does not
impose liability on the defendants unless without it, the
collision would not have occurred.3 2
The court further held that to support the inference that
excessive speed proximately caused the collision, the plaintiff
was required to produce "[s]ome evidence that if the bus had
been operated at a reasonable speed it could have been stopped
at some distance short of the collision point. .... " Here there
was no such evidence.
The decision attempts to lay at rest that specious reasoning
which would make excessive speed a proximate cause of every
collision, on the theory that the vehicle would not have been at
the point where the collision occurred had it not been traveling
at the speed which it traveled. In the words of the court:
That speed was a contributing factor in placing the bus at a
particular location on the highway when the emergency
arose is without legal significance, because the defendants
had the legal right to occupy that portion of the highway.3 8
In his dissenting opinion in the earlier case of Spencer V.
ffirby14 Mr. Chief Justice Stukes recognized the same principle
by stating that if the vehicle had been traveling even faster, it
conceivably would have been beyond the point of collision at the
instant of time when the adverse vehicle arrived there, and there-
fore it was illogical to say that the defendant's speed proximately
caused the wreck.
The court thus emphasized the rarity of the situation in the
Horton case:
This is simply one of those rare cases in which the evidence,
although sufficient to support an inference of concurrent
negligence by the defendants, is insufficient to support a
reasonable inference that without such negligence the col-
lision would not have occurred.
35
Mr. Justice Lewis dissented.
32. Id. at 438, 128 S.E.2d at 781.
33. Id. at 439, 128 S.E.2d at 781.
34. 234 S.C. 59, 106 S.E.2d 883 (1959).
35. Horton v. Greyhound Corp., supra note 31 at 441, 128 S.E.2d at 782.
1963]
16
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 16, Iss. 1 [], Art. 15
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol16/iss1/15
174 SOUTH CAROLINA LAW Rnvmw [Vol. 16
The Horton case shows that the doctrine of proximate cause
still retains vitality and cannot be neglected by attorneys for
either the plaintiff or the defendant, and that it can be used
successfully in the defense of a case by astute, careful and per-
suasive defense attorneys.
AGENCY
Two cases involved important points of the law of agency ap-
plied to automobile litigation, one on the family purpose doc-
trine, and the other on the admissibility of statements by a
driver.
In Porter v. Hardee,36 the automobile which caused the plain-
tiff's injuries was registered in the name of the defendant, Mr.
Hardee, Sr., but had been purchased by Mr. Hardee, Jr. with
his own money and registered in his father's name only because
he (Jr.) was a minor. The car was not used for general use of
the members of Mr. Hardee, Sr.'s family.
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment in the plaintiff's
favor and ordered judgment entered for the defendant, holding
that the family purpose doctrine could not be used to fasten
liability on the defendant, since he did not maintain or furnish
the vehicle for the use of his family. The court held that any
presumption of the defendant's ownership arising from the regis-
tration was rebutted by clear proof that the son actually owned
the car.
In the other case, Mar lu v. Thomason, 7 the court held, over
Mr. Justice Lewis's dissent, that statements made by the de-
fendant's agent or employee pertaining to an automobile accident
in which he was a participant are not admissible in evidence
against the defendant, his principal, unless they are spontaneous
and sufficiently contemporaneous with the time and place of the
accident to bring them within the res gestae doctrine.
CIRCUMSTANTIAL PROOF OF IDENTITY
OF TORT FEASOR
In rocker v. 'Weaters & West38 the Supreme Court held that
the evidence made out, at most, a jury issue as to whether the
plaintiff's intestate knew of the intoxicated condition of the
automobile's driver and continued to ride as a guest in the car
36. 241 S.C. 474, 129 S.E.2d 131 (1963).
37. 241 S.C. 84, 127 S.E.2d 177 (1962).
38. 240 S.C. 412, 126 SaE.2d 335 (1962).
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with such knowledge, and that it could not be held as a matter
of law that he was contributorily reckless.
The case is an important one on the second question it involved,
namely whether judgment should have been granted for the
defendant on the ground that at the time the accident occurred,
the plaintiff's intestate Kirby, and not the defendant West, was
driving the car. Weathers, West and Kirby had been together
in the car that Sunday afternoon, and when they left Wyatt's
Service Station three and eight-tenths miles before the accident
occurred, West had been driving, according to Wyatt's testimony.
The investigating officer testified that Weathers had made con-
flicting and contradictory statements, saying that Kirby had
been driving at the time of the accident and also saying that
Kirby had been driving when they came to Wyatt's Station, that
West drove when they left, and then they changed and Kirby
was driving again.
The Supreme Court affirmed the verdict for the plaintiff
which necessarily found that West had been the driver, holding
that the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given to
their testimony are matters for the jury, and that the failure of
Weathers and West to testify, without explanation, raises the
presumption that their testimony would have been unfavorable
to them.
Since there was no direct evidence as to the identity of the
driver at the time of the accident, when analyzed, the basis for
rationalizing the court's decision is this: the jury was justified
in rejecting completely Weathers' two variations, as testified to
by the investigating officer, under both of which Kirby was
driving at the time he was killed; therefore, with Weathers'
versions completely out of the case, the jury was justified in
inferring that West was driving at the time of the accident, in
view of Wyatt's testimony that West had been driving when the
three left his station, three and eight-tenths miles before the fatal
accident, since a condition proved to exist is presumed to con-
tinue, particularly in view of the failure of both West and
Weathers to testify.
AUTOMOBILE LAW-INTERSECTION COLLISIONS
Of the several cases this year which arose from the factual sit-
uation of intersection collision, the most important is Eberhiardt
v. Forrester.89 Mr. and Mrs. Eberhardt were proceeding east
39. 241 S.C. 399, 128 S.E.2d 687 (1962). This case is also noted in the
Agency section at note 16.
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along West Faris Road in Greenville in a Chrysler automobile
'when a Chevrolet automobile being driven north by Smith on
Brookview Circle collided with the right front door of the
Chrysler causing injuries to the Eberhardts. The Chevrolet was
owned by Forrester and Clardy, used car dealers, and was being
tried out by Smith, a prospective buyer. West Faris Road was a
"through highway" within the applicable statute.40 However,
the stop sign on Brookview Circle at the entrance to West Faris
Road was not in place and had evidently been removed and not
yet replaced in the course of widening Brookview Circle. Smith
was not familiar with the area, while Eberhardt was and knew
that West Faris Road was a through highway.
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment for Smith, and
remanded for a new trial, on the ground that the trial judge
erred in instructing the jury that neither street was a through
highway, and in charging Section 46-421 omitting the last sen-
tence.4' The appeal presented the novel and important question
of the effect of the temporary removal of a stop sign, whether
the temporary absence caused the principal road to lose its char-
acter as a through highway. The court stated the following gen-
eral principles which represent the weight of authority:
1. Once a through street or arterial highway has been
properly designated and appropriate signs have been erected,
the preferred status of the highway is not lost merely be-
cause a stop sign is misplaced, improperly removed, de-
stroyed or obliterated.
2. A motorist on a preferred highway is entitled to as-
sume that a vehicle approaching on a secondary highway
will stop for the intersection, unless he has knowledge of
the absence of the sign, or he is otherwise put on notice that
the vehicle on the intersecting street is not going to stop.
3. A motorist on a secondary highway is required to stop
if he has knowledge of the nature of the preferred highway,
even though the sign is absent.
4. A motorist on a secondary highway is not required to
stop in the temporary absence of a stop sign, if he does not
40. S.C. CODE § 46-252 (1962).
41. S.C. CoDE § 46-421 provides as follows: "The driver of a vehicle ap-
proaching an intersection shall yield the right of way to a vehicle which has
entered the intersection from different highway. When two vehicles enter an
intersection from different highways at approximately the same time, the driver
of the vehicle on the left shall yield the right of way to the vehicle on the right.
The right-of-way rules declared in this section are modified at through high-
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have knowledge of the character of the preferred highway,
but may still be liable if he is otherwise negligent.
42
Gutkke v. Morris & Johnson4" arose from a collision involving
the Morris automobile and an automobile driven by Mrs. John-
son in which the plaintiff, Mr. Guthke, was riding. Mrs. Johnson
was leaving Magnolia Cemetery near Charleston, entering Hu-
guenin Avenue from behind a solid brick wall located 25 feet
east of and parallel to Huguenin Avenue. According to her own
testimony, Mrs. Johnson never came to a complete stop and never
saw the approaching Morris automobile. When her daughter
yelled and she heard Morris' brakes squealing, Mrs. Johnson
tried to make it across the street. On Mrs. Johnson's appeal from
the verdicts against her in favor of both the plaintiff Guthke and
the defendant Morris, the court held that it was properly a jury
issue whether Mrs. Johnson could have avoided the collision,
even after she was belatedly alerted to the danger, by yielding
the right-of-way rather than accelerating her speed.
The Supreme Court held that the trial court should not have
charged Section 46-475 of the 1962 Code, which requires a motor-
ist to stop when emerging from a driveway in a business or resi-
dence district, since the area of the collision was occupied by
cemeteries; however, that no prejudice resulted to the appellant,
since the factual situation which confronted Mrs. Johnson when
about to enter the highway required her to stop in order to yield
the right-of-way, and since the trial court had charged the ap-
pellant's request that a motorist entering a highway from a pri-
vate gate or drive is required to yield the right-of-way to traffic
in the highway, not necessarily to stop.
The statement contained in the opinion that Mrs. Johnson was
required to stop in order to yield the right-of-way must be lim-
ited to the factual situation before the court, and in no way
impugns the authority of such cases as Spencer v. Kirby44 which
construe Section 46-42445 as not necessarily requiring a full stop
in order to yield the right-of-way.
Hicks v. Coleman46 involved the question of liability where
the defendant's automobile while heading south came around the
42. Eberhardt v. Forrester, mspra note 39 at 406, 128 S.E.2d at 691.
43. 242 S.C. 56, 129 S.E.2d 732 (1963).
44. 234 S.C. 59, 196 S.E.2d 883 (1959).
45. S.C. CoDE § 46-424 provides as follows: "The driver of a vehicle about
to enter or cross a highway from a private road or driveway shall yield the
right of way to all vehicles approaching on such highway."
46. 240 S.C. 223, 125 SE.2d 470 (1962).
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right side of a large truck also headed south and struck the side
of the plaintiff's automobile which had made a left turn, heading
from north to the west. The defendant on appeal contended that
the plaintiff had turned left at the busy intersection directly in
front and in the path of defendant's automobile which had the
right-of-way. Since there was a question of speed on the part
of the defendant's automobile, the Supreme Court affirmed,
holding that all issues were properly jury issues.
Marshall v. Thomason47 held that the plaintiff was not guilty
of contributory negligence as a matter of law in attempting to
turn behind the defendant's dump truck apparently attempting
to enter the highway from the plaintiff's right, after it had
stopped for a stop sign.
The court held that a jury issue existed in the case of Young V.
Bost48 as to whether the negligence of the driver of the car in
which the plaintiff was riding was the sole proximate cause of
the collision. The suit arose from an intersectional collision in
which the driver of the car in which the plaintiff was riding was
making a left turn.
Though Norton v. Ewaskio4O arose from an automobile inter-
section collision, the issues raised on appeal primarily concern
Practice and Procedure and Damages, and therefore will not be
discussed here.
OTHER AUTOMOBILE CASES
In Shearer v. DeShon50 the facts were substantially as follows:
The plaintiff's decedent was a guest passenger in the front seat
of a 1957 Volkswagen automobile owned by the defendant, Ray-
mond DeShon and being operated by his minor daughter, Char-
lotte Faye DeShon. The car was traveling in a northerly direc-
tion on South Carolina Highway No. 421 in Aiken County about
8:40 p.m. on a dark, cloudy and rainy night. The plaintiff's in-
testate was killed in the collision which occurred between the
DeShon Volkswagen and an automobile being driven in a south-
erly direction on South Carolina Highway No. 421 by the de-
fendant Lyle, when Lyle made a left turn across the lane of
travel of the DeShon automobile. There was some testimony that
the speed of the DeShon automobile exceeded the posted speed
47. 241 S.C. 84, 127 S.E.2d 177 (1962). This case is also noted in the
Agency section at note 17.
48. 241 S.C. 289, 128 S.E.2d 118 (1962).
49. 241 S.C. 557, 129 S.E.2d 517 (1963).
50. 240 S.C. 472, 162 S.E.2d 514 (1962).
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limit of 35 miles per hour. The defendant Lyle testified that he
did not see the Volkswagen until it was right upon him.
In the suit for the wrongful death of Glenda Shearer, against
the defendants DeShon and the defendant Lyle, the jury re-
turned a verdict in the sum of $10,000.00 actual damages against
the defendants DeShon and $1,000.00 against Lyle.
Upon appeal by the defendant DeShon, the Supreme Court
sustained the verdict of the jury finding recklessness on the part
of the defendant DeShon upon the following grounds:
(1) There was evidence from which the jury could have deter-
mined that the defendant DeShon violated the speed statutes51
and, of course, causative violation of an applicable statute con-
stitutes actionable negligence and is evidence of recklessness,
willfulness and wantonness;
12
(2) There was evidence in the record that the driver of the
DeShon car recklessly failed to keep a proper lookout and to
have her automobile under proper control under conditions
known to her immediately prior to and at the time and place of
the collision. Under the authority of Spurling v. Oolprovia Prod.
C'o.53 if any testimony is introduced touching or supporting the
allegations of failure to keep a proper lookout or have proper
control, it would ordinarily be a jury question as to whether
such conduct constitutes a reckless disregard of the rights of a
passenger within the meaning of the guest statute.
There was testimony that immediately prior to the collision,
the minor defendant DeShon, driver of the Volkswagen auto-
mobile took a cigarette and lit it and turned around to throw
the matches to the witness who was riding in the back seat while
driving with her elbows.
The appellants DeShon further contended that even if she
were guilty of gross negligence or recklessness, there was no
showing of a causal connection between such wrongdoing and
the collision, and that she had no chance to avoid the collision
because of the proximity of the Lyle car to hers when it was
driven across her lane of travel. The Supreme Court stated that
such was one inference which could be drawn from the testimony
and estimates of the witnesses as to the proximity of the cars
when the turn was made by Lyle. However, the court pointed out
that other inferences were possible, namely that the Lyle car
51. S.C. CODE §§ 46-361-363 (1962).
52. Field v. Gregory, 230 S.C. 39, 94 S.E.2d 15 (1956).
53. 185 S.C. 449, 194 S.E. 332 (1937).
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started turning slowly at Kirkland's Grocery shown to be 100
feet from the point of impact, and that there was testimony that
Lyles stopped his car in the highway before making the turn,
gave a proper signal and waited for one car to pass and then
proceeded slowly across the highway. The court refused to say
that the negligence of the defendant DeShon was not the proxi-
mate cause of the collision, but rather held that a jury issue as
the proximate cause was presented.
The case also illustrates the unusual procedural rule in South
Carolina that actual damages may be apportioned by the jury
between joint tort feasors.
Eberhardt v. Forreste;.5 4 is an important decision on the issue
of liability of the owner of an automobile having defective
brakes for furnishing it for another's use. The automobile in
question was owned by Forrester & Clardy, used car dealers,
who had loaned it to Smith to try out. The trial judge excluded
testimony offered by the Eberhardts that when Clardy arrived
at the scene of the accident, Smith told Clardy, "These brakes
are the hardest on this car that I have ever seen-on any car I
have ever driven," to which Clardy replied, "When the car left
the shop the brakes were OK." The lower court had directed a
verdict in favor of Forrester and Clardy on the ground that
there was no proof of agency between them and Smith and also
that there was insufficient evidence to go to the jury against
them as bailors. The trial judge's ruling on the bailment point
was based upon the authority of Howle v. McDaniel.5 5 The Su-
preme Court held that the testimony offered by the Eberhardts
was erroneously excluded, stating the principle of law involved
as follows, quoted from an Alabama case"0 :
In order to establish a prima facie case, i.e., one sufficient
to go to the jury, there must be some substantial evidence
tending to show: (1) That the brakes were defective; (2)
That such defective condition of the brakes was the proxi-
mate cause of the injury; (3) That the defendant knew or
by the exercise of reasonable care ought to have known that
the brakes were defective at the time the automobile was
delivered. 57
54. 241 S.C. 399, 128 S.E.2d 687 (1962). Discussed on another point at note
39 supra.
55. 232 S.C. 125, 101 S.E.2d 255 (1957).
56. Al DeMent Chevrolet Co. v. Wilson, 252 Ala. 662, 42 So.2d 585 (1949),
in which a prospective purchaser was trying out a used car.
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Taylor v. South Carolina State Highway Dep't5" is one of those
rare cases in which the testimony and the inferences to be drawn
therefrom, even under South Carolina's modified Scintilla Rule,
are not sufficient to make a jury issue as to negligence on the
part of the defendant.
On a clear morning in April, 1960, the plaintiff was riding as
a passenger on U. S. Highway 321, several miles north of Co-
lumbia, traveling north in the righthand lane. A Highway De-
partment motor grader was scraping a deposit of clay from a
portion of the plaintiff's lane of travel, which clay had been
dropped from trucks entering the highway from a clay pit. The
motor grader had previously made one run from the entrance
of the clay pit to the end of the deposit, which did not clear
the highway, and the operator had commenced backing to get
into position for another run. When a southbound automobile
approached, the motor grader operator stopped in the north-
bound lane to wait for traffic to clear, He saw the car in which
the plaintiff was traveling as it rounded a curve, some three or
four hundred feet behind a sand truck. The sand truck came to
a gradual stop behind the motor grader, after an interval of two
or three seconds the southbound car passed in the opposite lane
and then in another second or two the car in which the plaintiff
was traveling ran into the rear of the tractor-trailer sand truck,
killing the driver and injuring the plaintiff.
The plaintiff originally brought suit against the sand com-
pany and the Highway Department, but he took a voluntary
non-suit as to the sand company. At the conclusion of all of the
testimony the trial judge directed a verdict in favor of the High-
way Department, from which the plaintiff appealed.
The Supreme Court held that the evidence did not raise a
jury issue as to the negligence of the defendant State Highway
Department. The plaintiff contended that the defendant's failure
to provide signs or other warning of the work in progress vio-
lated a rule of the Highway Department, which amounted to
negligence per se, and also violated the common law. The rule
provided that when maintenance or reconstruction work was
being performed upon the roadway and one-way traffic is being
maintained, certain signs are required to be placed and flagmen
posted. The Supreme Court held that this rule was not appli-
cable, since the work in progress and the motor grader created
a passing situation for northbound traffic rather than a one-way
58. 242 S.C. 171, 130 S.E.2d 418 (1963).
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traffic situation within the meaning of the rule. The court fur-
ther held that the failure to place signs or give other warning
did not amount to negligence under common law because the
morning was clear, the pavement was dry, traffic was not heavy
and the work site was clearly visible for a long distance in both
directions. The motor grader was in plain view of the plaintiff
and the driver of his automobile when they rounded the curve
some 1,000 feet south of it. In the words of the court:
No sign was required to warn them of what was obvious at
a greater distance than such signs, when appropriate, are
required to be placed. If plaintiff and his companion were
unaware of the presence of the motor grader on the high-
way, it must be attributed to their failure to keep a reason-
able lookout, rather than to the failure of the operator to put
out warning signs. Under the particular circumstances of
this case no reasonable inference of negligence can be drawn
from the absence of such signs.11
The court further dismissed the plaintiff's contention that the
operator of the motor grader was negligent in continuing to back
for some 50 feet after he observed the sand truck coming around
the distant curve, the court stating that a significant interval
of time before an emergency situation arose.
The court further held that the contended violation of Section
46-481 which prohibits stopping or parking a vehicle on the
main travel part of the highway when practicable to stop or
park off of such portion of the highway was inapplicable to
this case, since motor vehicles and other equipment actually
engaged in work upon the surface of the highway are exempted
from requirements of this Section and from the other previsions
of the Uniform Act Regulating Traffic.
The plaintiff further contended that the negligence on the
part of the Highway Department caused the sand truck to stop
in such a manner as to create a cloud of dust which obscured
the vision of the driver of the automobile in which the plaintiff
was riding and resulted in the collision. The court dismissed this
contention, since the complaint did not allege that the Highway
Department was responsible for such dust as was present, but
rather alleged the presence of the dust as negligence on the part
of the sand company. The court stated:
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These allegations, together with all other specifications of
negligence against the Sand Company, went out of the case
when the voluntary non-suit was taken, leaving no reference
whatever to dust in the specifications of negligence on which
the case was tried.60
This point illustrates the fact that under our present procedure,
pleadings are still all-important, and that the practitioner of
negligence law must not only prove sufficient negligence to make
a jury issue, but he must have alleged in his complaint the negli-
gence which he proves.
In Cain v. Beecher 1 the plaintiff's testator was killed when
struck by the defendant's tractor-trailer outfit being maneuvered
in the driveway of the National Guard Armory at Georgetown.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the verdict for the plaintiff,
holding that in view of the plaintiff's testator's intoxication
which was known to the defendants, of his presence around the
equipment, and of his repeated attempts to enter the vehicle, a
jury question was presented as to whether the defendants' agent,
the lookout, sufficiently discharged his duty of ascertaining
whether Cain's person was sufficiently far from the outfit not
to be injured in its movement.
In Rutland v. Sikes62 a wrongful death action, the evidence
as to negligence was entirely circumstantial evidence, as the
drivers of both dump trucks involved in the collision were killed
in the impact. The fatal collision took place on a portion of the
sand-clay surface of an interstate highway under construction
entirely in the half of the roadway on the plaintiff's intestate's
right. Also, an inference of excessive speed could be drawn from
the extensive damage to both trucks, the deaths of both drivers
and the hurling through the air of the loaded body of the de-
fendant's truck. The appellate court sustained the jury verdict
for the plaintiff, holding that even assuming the statutory law
requiring motorists to drive to the right of the center line of
any roadway to be inapplicable to a highway under construction
not yet open to the general public, nevertheless driving a vehicle
to the right of the roadway is required by common law. The
court further held that the fact that the defendants' driver was
on the wrong side of the road warrants an inference of fault on
his part despite the speculation that some sudden emergency
caused him to move over to that side.
60. Id. at 181, 130 S.E.2d at 424.
61. 310 F.2d 241 (4th Cir., 1962).
62. 311 F.2d 538 (4th Cir., 1962).
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The court stated:
The fact that there were no eyewitnesses does not deprive
the finder of fact of the power of drawing reasonable infer-
ences founded upon common experience from the circum-
stantial evidence, and the exercise of this power is not made
insupportable by speculative assumptions that extraordinary
circumstances might have existed, which, if established,
would make the inference untenable.6 3
One point made by the defendants on appeal was that they
were not liable under the borrowed servant doctrine. The de-
fendants Sikes were furnishing trucks and drivers to a subcon-
tractor, Braxton, who was engaged in moving sand, clay and
earth. The driver in question, and others, were employed by the
defendants and were subject to supervision and discharge by
them. When Sikes was not present, his drivers would follow
Braxton's instructions. Sikes' drivers were carried on Braxton's
payroll but according to the testimony this was done solely to
enable Braxton to certify that the drivers had been paid the
federal minimum wage. Such payments by Braxton were de-
ducted from the amounts due to the defendants on the basis of
the amount of materials moved in their trucks. The appellate
court held that Braxton did not specifically assume immediate
control over Sikes" driver to an extent necessary to bring the
borrowed servant doctrine into play and to relieve Sikes, the
general employer, from responsibility for the acts of his servant.
McDonnell v. Floyd6 4 primarily concerns the admissibility of
evidence of an experiment, upon which question the case was
reversed and remanded. However, the court held that the plain-
tiff was not barred by contributory negligence as a matter of
law and that a jury issue was presented by facts showing that
the plaintiffs' car was stopped headed east on a secondary road
without lights, with the defendant Hucks' pick-up truck along-
side it headed west, and that when the vehicle of the defendants
Floyd and Cantrell approached, the plaintiff got behind her
car before it was struck by the Floyd-Cantrell vehicle.
Gaines v. Thomas"5 is primarily of interest for the evidence
questions it decides: Therefore, it will not be discussed under
the topic of Tort.
63. Id. at 540-541.
64. 240 S.C. 158, 125 S.E.2d 4 (1962).
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